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The empowerment of women within households remains a major issue around the world including
in Africa. We have conducted a study in Burundi coupling discussion sessions with microfinancing
to determine if they enhance the role of women in decisions regarding household purchases and the
reduction of domestic violence.  We compare our findings to that from a published study in South
Africa that combined discussion sessions on life skills and health on reduction in domestic violence
and decisions on economic issues. Both studies used randomized controlled experiments.   Both studies
show a trend towards increases in household authority, with the Burundi study showing statistical
significance.  In South Africa there was a large, albeit short lived decrease in domestic violence. In
Burundi there was small reduction but trends suggest a longer duration. The effects on overall empowerment
are small. These studies suggest that a more sustained use of discussion sessions may result in longer
and more sustained economic and social empowerment. Future research could focus on the longer
term effects of the use of discussion sessions and investigate how the observed impacts can be sustained
in magnitude and duration.
Radha Iyengar
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Empowerment of women within households and reduction in domestic violence remains a major 
issue around the world including Africa. Despite this, there is a lack of broad evidence and little 
consensus either among scholars or among practitioners as to what programs or policies are 
effective. In particular, the debate remains as to whether economic conditions, such as wage 
rates or labor market opportunities, affect bargaining power and  reduction in violence on the 
one hand or whether specific gender-based programs are required. This paper describes an 
impact evaluation of a financial skills and negotiation training program in conjunction with 
microfinancing in Burundi compared to data from a previously published study on gender-based 
training for women receiving microfinancing in South Africa. 
 
The Burundi program coupled discussion groups for both women and men with participation and 
financing for women in local savings and loan association. The discussion groups focused on 
financial decision making within households with the aim increasing the role of women in 
household decision making and in reducing domestic violence towards women. The program 
was designed to provide women with access to economic resources through village savings and 
loan associations (VSLA).The International Refugee Committee (IRC) randomly selected half of 
the members in each of the 25 VSLAs groups to participate in a set of 6 discussion sessions 
where it shared with women and their spouses progressive attitudes about the role of gender in 
household decision making regarding finances. The evaluation utilized focus groups to 
investigate whether the discussion sessions were effective at increasing the role of women in 
decisions regarding household purchases and concomitantly in reducing violence against 
women. 
 
In this study we compared the Burundi program to the well-known program in South Africa - 
Microfinance for Gender Equity (IMAGE).  The South African study was designed to increase 
access to resources and reduce violence for poor women (Kim, et al 2009). The program 
included both microfinancing and a 10-session group course for the women. In South Africa, the 
study focused on general life skills and specific gender issues like fertility and sexually 
transmitted diseases. In South Africa the program was purposefully targeted at women and 
intended specifically to reduce violence in the household.   
 
Both studies show that discussion sessions in conjunction with microcredit participation 
improves financial decision making authority for women, reduces exposure to violence, reduces 
acceptance of violence, and increases consumption of household goods relative to luxury goods 
such as alcohol. The evidence from both studies suggests that discussion groups may be a 
useful approach for empowering women when applied in combination with the improved 
economic access provided by microcredit participation. In the following sections we present the 
program and evaluation designs, the sources of data and the related timeline and outputs.  
 
 
 2. BACKGROUND 
 
Programs to reduce gender-based violence have spanned a range of countries in Southern, 
Central, and Eastern Africa with varying degrees of success.   In part this is because these 
programs have been largely divorced from theories on underlying causes of intimate partner 
violence. Theories on the relationship between resources and violence are abundant in 
several disciplines including psychology, sociology and economics.  Despite this there is 
limited empirical evidence to distinguish between these models. 
 
In psychology, there are a range of theories and explanations for violence.  Broadly speaking, 
there have been two types of theories.
1  The first characterize violence as due to either a lack of 
control during escalating arguments.  Such violence programs focus on anger management 
programs and more detailed cognitive behavioural therapy as a means to reduce violence. 
(Dutton and Corvo, 2006).  If increased resources reduce conflict within the household then 
regardless of who the resources are provided to, violence should reduce. On the other hand, if 
female resources increase conflict then the chance of escalation to violence increases.  An 
alternative theory is that violence is a strategically chosen systematic means to exercise control.  
Strategic violence for the purposes of control might therefore increase as women have 
increased access to resources. 
 
Work by sociologists and criminologist largely focuses on social and contextual causes of 
violence but parallels closely the psychology theories.  In these fields, there are two prominent 
sets of theories: “exposure” and “backlash”.  The exposure theory focuses on the amount of 
time spent together.  This is similar to the violence is due to lack of control described in the 
psychology literature.   Programs that increase income-generating activities by women or 
generally increase separation will reduce violence by reducing the time partners spend together.  
Similarly, increased unemployment by men may increase violence by increasing the time 
partners spend together (Laura Dugan, Daniel Nagin and Richard Rosenfeld, 1999). The other 
theory is that of “male backlash” related to the strategic violence theory cited in psychology. 
Aizer (2010) gives a detailed description of this literature but the basic concept is that increased 
financial independence by women increases repression by men in other areas of interaction.  As 
a result, increased access to resources for women will increase violence. 
 
In contrast, work by economists typically focuses on modeling household interactions.  While 
neoclassical models of unitary household decision making (such as Becker, 1965) are still used 
occasionally data from a wide range of settings have rejected several features of the unitary 
model.  This has led to a now large literature that models household decisions as the result of 
bargaining among household members (e.g., Browning and Chiappori 1998).  These models 
have helped frame findings from developing countries that show that increases in the female 




2000. household, induce an allocation of resources that better reflects her preferences (Duflo 2003; 
Rangel 2005).  This allocation tends to feature greater investment in education, housing, and 
nutrition for children (Strauss and Thomas 1995; Duflo 2003).  Many now see women’s 
empowerment as key to improving the welfare of women and children.  To date, however, there 
is little evidence that externally induced “empowerment” is effective.  While experimental 
evidence does suggest that legal control of a new asset empowers women (Ashraf, Karlan, and 
Yin 2006), this empowerment effect is short-lived.  Typically these models do not include 
violence though adaptations by Aizer (2010) and Pollack (2005) present results where the 
man’s utility increasing in violence and the woman’s decreasing in violence.  In such models, 
increased resources increase women’s bargaining power suggesting that violence should 
decrease.  However, this is only true if the increased resources imply an increased outside 
opportunity.    
 
Empirical evidence distinguishing the theories largely comes from economists who have 
employed structural methods or used panel data to overcome the problem posed by 
endogenous wages. Bowlus and Seitz (2006) use structural methods to estimate a negative 
impact of female employment on abuse.  Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991) and Farmer and 
Tiefenthaler (1997) utilized panel data on victims of domestic violence to examine the impact of 
changes in a woman’s income over time on violence.   In all cases, there is limited ability to 
distinguish between resources affecting violence and reverse causality of violence affecting 
resources and unemployment.  Recent work by Aizer (2009) uses demand shocks in female-
dominant sectors to identify the effect of increased wages on violence. Aizer’s findings suggest 
increase resources reduce violence and are thus inconsistent with the backlash/strategic control 
models  that predict that as women’s wages increase, violence against them increases.   In 
addition, Aizer find that violence reduction occurs during non-working hours, inconsistent with 
the exposure/lack of control models as well.  Aizer’s work provides important insight into 
settings where outside options improve and women have substantial economic and social 
freedom.  In many settings across the world and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, women 
have few outside options.  Women often have few legal rights and there is extreme social 
pressure to stay in marriages that are often extremely abusive.  There is even more limited 
evidence on the role of resources and negotiations in these settings.  The only existing evidence 
on the impact of women’s economic status on domestic violence comes from an experiment in 
South Africa and Burundi VSLA interventions described below.   
 
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND BURUNDI 
 
Among the most prominent of these experiments to reduce intimate partner violence was the 
program with Microfinance for Gender Equity (IMAGE) in South Africa, a cooperative study 
between the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), Wits University in 
Johannesburg, and the microfinance NGO Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF). When this study 
was first implemented, SEF had been working in the Limpopo Province of South Africa for nine 
years. Limpopo is one of the poorer provinces in South Africa, with 50% of its population 
earning 800 Rands or less a month in 2001
1. The IMAGE pilot was introduced in the peri-urban area around the mining town of Burgersfort, Sekhukhuneland. The researchers from LSHTM 
and Wits Universities structured a 10-session curriculum on life skills, health and gender training 
to be administered to the women receiving microloans.  The sessions were structured as 
discussion forums for adult learning facilitated by a group of social workers specially trained for 
the task. The ten sessions were offered to women fortnightly, at repayment meetings. The 
training entailed the discussion of gender roles and self-awareness, as well as communication 
on difficult issues, especially around HIV, and within the household.
2 The training was bundled 
into a package that also entailed participation into the pro-poor group-lending program that SEF 
runs in the province, based on the Grameen model of group lending schemes, where 
participants form groups of five individuals that are jointly liable for the repayment of their 
individual loans.  
 
The framework followed by the IMAGE researchers is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. As 
shown in the diagram, there is a common risk environment that determines a number of 
structural – in public health terms – and cultural and socio-economic conditions that determine 
the vulnerability of the women. The aim of the IMAGE program was to break this vicious cycle 
by breaking the cycle of poverty the women are trapped into and alter the women’s perceptions 
of gender norms, thereby increasing their empowerment not just by giving them access to 
increased income, but also by altering their attitudes to violence and their decision making skills.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In 2001, the IMAGE study was designed as a pilot study of the introduction of a microfinance 
and training (mf plus) product in a new market. It was geared towards understanding the 
intervention’s efficacy, in view of possibly expanding operations in the area. To our knowledge it 
was the first randomized controlled trial of an mf plus. It compared the full package of 
microfinance and life skills and gender training versus no program participation.
3 This is in line 
with the multifaceted nature of the risk that the study hypothesized the individuals to be faced 
with, and does not allow us to disentangle the effects of each component

















(2009) The IMAGE evaluation assigned villages randomly to treatment (microloans plus discussion 
sessions) and control. The study villages were first assigned to three different groups on the 
basis of their size and accessibility – large and accessible, two pairs of medium and accessible, 
and small ad inaccessible – to reflect the typology of villages in the area, because it was 
hypothesized that villages that were larger and closer to main roads would have a more 
dynamic market than smaller villages, or villages that were not as close to main roads. Village 
characteristics were measured during field reconnaissance visits, due to lack of census data on 
these villages at the time the pilot started.  
 
Randomization happened at the level of the cluster defined by the village pair, and individual 
villages were randomized either to treatment or to control by means of a lottery. Each of the 
three clusters contained two villages, and the lottery assigned these randomly to treatment 
immediately, or to deferred treatment. The women joined in groups of five in each village, 
generating between a minimum of 9 to a maximum of 30 groups per village.  
 
Within both intervention and control villages, the pool of individuals eligible to join the program 
was identified by means of a participatory rural appraisal technique, called participatory wealth 
ranking (PWR), devised by the collaborating NGO, and whose consistency with statistical 
methods has been tested and discussed elsewhere (Hargreaves et al., 2007). The program was 
designed to measure the effectiveness of the intervention, and it compared treated individuals in 
the villages assigned to treatment versus non-treated eligible individuals in control villages; this 
implies that we would find some statistically significant differences at baseline for socio-
demographic characteristics that could bias the estimates, and that we therefore controlled for. 
Finally, because the level of treatment is the village, we clustered the errors at the village level. 
Program evaluation happened at two points in time: the baseline survey was collected in 2001-
2002, and the follow up survey in 2003-2004, so that each individual would be interviewed 2 
years after their baseline interview. Interviewers received one month of training prior to going to 
the field.  
 
In contrast to previous efforts to enhance women’s empowerment, the program in Burundi did 
not to focus on women’s empowerment explicitly, fearing backlash in the home and community, 
and increase women’s vulnerability to violence in the short-term. Instead, the program 
approached the issues of empowerment and gender-based violence subtly by encouraging 
discussion among partners to analyze how men and women relate to one another within the 
privacy of their homes in negotiating access to and control over household resources. While the 
courses did not explicitly deal with gender issues, the hypothesis driving the program was that 
encouraging husbands and wives to discuss household decisions and respect women’s 
opinions may improve women’s decision making power in the home. The courses were 
conceived to help facilitate a household atmosphere where women (and their opinions) would 
be more valued and violence against them becomes a less acceptable way of solving issues 
and conflicts. This change in attitudes and respect could reduce vulnerability to violence within 
the household.  
 The Burundi program, run by the IRC, established the pilot VSLA program in the Makamba 
province of Burundi. The pilot project involved 25 groups across the Makamba Province in 
Burundi: 7 in Nyanza-Lac, 6 in Kibago, 6 in Kayagoro, and 6 in Mabanda. In addition to 
implementing the VSLA methodology according to the guidelines and principles developed by 
CARE International, researchers from London School of Economics (with input from IRC) 
developed a 6-course discussion group series that addressed household decision-making along 
gender lines, the respective roles of women and men, and the use of violence against women in 
the home more broadly. Half of the participants in the VSLAs were invited to attend these 
discussions with their spouses. IRC staff members from the gender-based violence program 
were trained to facilitate these discussion groups. The basic logic model is presented below. 
This impact evaluation is among the few detailed studies IRC has ongoing in post-conflict 
countries. IRC has partnered with academic evaluators in Liberia, Congo, and Cote d’Ivoire, to 




The Burundi evaluation is relatively unique because it used randomization more narrowly than 
other evaluation designs that are based on a complete random assignment of units 
(communities, villages, individuals) into treatment and control. Such broad randomization, 
although very valuable for testing overall effectiveness does not provide insights into what parts 
of a program work and how existing programs may be specifically enhanced. In Burundi, the 
VSLAs were already formed at the time the evaluation began, thereby limiting the random 
assignment to units into which individuals had already self-selected. Thus, although this 
evaluation cannot assess the effectiveness of the VSLA program overall – which would require 
a control group that does not receive VSLA – it can assess the degree to which an important 
additional variation of the program design is more or less effective at influencing women’s 
empowerment, defined here as their ability to not only access economic resources but also 
participate in controlling them.  
 
The cluster unit of randomization was the VSLA
 but randomization occurred at the individual 
level, with half of each VSLA’s members selected randomly into the treatment – i.e. the 
discussion groups – through a lottery, held in each VSLA.
6 Slips were drawn from a hat, and 















The program was evaluated at different points in time, and both quantitative and qualitative data 
were analyzed statistically, in order to fully capture the complexity of the programmatic impact. 
After the initial formation of groups through the community-based facilitators the IRC conducted 
a baseline survey of all participants to determine attitudes and assess comparability of 
treatment (discussion group attendees) and control groups. During the course of the discussion 
groups, IRC designed monitoring tools were used to test the comprehension and retention of 
discussion group material. These tools can also used to improve the quality of how the 
discussion groups are designed and facilitated along the way and during the 2nd phase of 
implementation. After the conclusion of the discussion groups, the IRC conducted a second 
survey to determine direct immediate-effect of discussion groups on attitudes. At this stage, the 
IRC also conducted four focus groups, with both treated and non-treated men and women, to 
contextualize and enrich the quantitative findings from the post-discussion focus group survey. 
After the VSLA groups had completed their one-year cycle, and savings plus interest had been 
distributed to all participants, the IRC conducted a final survey of the short-run effects of VSLA 
participation and attendance in facilitated discussion groups on reported outcomes. In theory, 
participation by both men and women can also open up opportunities for dialogue over 
economic decisions from more equalized positions of power, which is often a critical barrier to 
economic self-reliance among women. The discussion sessions were conceived to improve 
attitudes towards women’s empowerment, thereby decreasing their vulnerability to violence in 
the home. We formulated and tested four hypotheses to investigate whether and how women’s 
empowerment was increased and their vulnerability reduced as a consequence of the 
intervention.  
 
3.1 Sampling and Design 
3.1.1 Burundi  
The sample of treatment and control participants was drawn from the VSLA groups initially 
formed through members of the community designated as community based facilitators 
(CBF).In order to determine the sample size necessary to detect a significant change in the 
outcome measures, we conducted a power analysis of a one tailed test of Treatment = Control 
against the two-sided alternative Treatment ≠ Control. To conduct a power analysis to 
determine feasibility, we used previous related work by Kim, et al (2007).Kim et al provided 
microfinance and sexual health and empowerment counseling to women in South Africa, and 
found that average effect sizes among treatment group women revealed a reduction of almost 
half relative to their control group counterparts. With such a large effect, the pilot study sample 







the discussion groups would result in insufficient statistical power to detect an effect. To determine if such a distribution was applicable to the Burundi population we compared the 
results from the baseline survey to the South African sample. The baseline survey used the 
Hurt, Insult, Threat, Scream (HITS) screening tool.
8 This tool was designed as a "paper-and-
pencil" instrument for identifying both physical and verbal abuse. It includes four items: physical 
abuse (such as hitting or punching), insults, threats and screaming. The four items are scored 
on a Likert 5-point scale.
9  
 
Baseline results indicate that the distribution of violence among respondents in Burundi is 
similar to that of respondents in the South African sample analyzed by Kim et al. Applying the 
same distribution (mean and standard deviation) of the population in Burundi would imply that 
the minimum effect size the current pilot could significantly detect is a 27 percent change in 
outcome values. This is significantly smaller than the economic well-being and attitude effects 
detected in Kim et al (2009).
10  
 
To increase power for analysis, the sample was randomly drawn from each of the 25 groups so 
that the probability of being chosen for any respondent was 50 percent conditional on being in 
their VSLA group. Because of a small number of absences, the overall probability of any given 
VSLA member being chosen to participate in the discussion groups was 48 percent. Absences 
were random and so this slight divergence does not significantly affect the comparability of the 
control and treatment groups.  
 
3.1.2 South Africa  
For the study of the IMAGE program, no prior estimates of impact for similar studies existed for 
all outcomes(Hargreaves et al., 03PRT/24), hence the protocol for the study published expected 
outcomes and interval estimates for such outcomes, discussing the sensitivity of results to 
changes in key statistical parameters. In particular, because the power for the estimation of 
impact in randomized trials at the village level is influenced by the number of villages included in 
the study, the number of individuals in each village, and the intra-class correlation coefficient 


















attribute any statistically significant difference in the outcomes to the intervention. taking these elements into account.
11 However because virtually no data was available on either 
the intra-class correlation coefficient, nor on various outcomes variables, the protocol reported a 
range of such estimates, for different values of both baseline prevalence rates and intra-class 
correlation coefficients for the key outcomes it focused on. 
12 
 
3.2 Distinguishing Between Theories   
The evaluation design allows distinguishing the effect of increased resources in addition to 
discussion sessions.  Broadly the studies test whether increased access to resources results in 
increased control of resources and the extent to which improved information on the benefits of 
cooperative household decision making relative to sole-male, sometime violence decision 
making reduced violence. In both studies, the underlying hypothesis is that the program acts by 
both improving the woman’s economic status and her ability to negotiate her role within the 
household. In turn, this should imply that the resources she brings into the household remain 
under her control to a greater extent because she has learned to better negotiate her role; and 
her demands for increased autonomy are less likely to be perceived as threatening by the man, 
because the woman is bringing in resources of her own, and therefore may be seen as more of 
an equal by her partner.  
 
Compared to a situation where the women are do receive microfinancing and participate in 
discussion sessions, the joint administration of these two services should support the woman in 
improving her status in the household in a non-threatening, and rather constructive manner, so 
that she may play a more autonomous and constructive role in household decision making, and 
thereby reduce her exposure to violence.  
 
If increased resources reduce conflict in the household then microfinance programs alone may 
be sufficient to reduce violence.  However, if who receives resources matter, this may be due to 
either the economic bargaining model by economist or the backlash/strategic violence theory by 
sociologists and psychologists.  If increased resources to women reduce violence, this is 
supportive of the bargaining model.  However, changes in resource levels should only salient if 
women have access and decision making power over the use of these resources.  Thus the 
question also arises about whether if changes in resource control are required, this may better 
accomplished in single sex or mixed sex interventions. 
 
The two investigations in South Africa and Burundi explore different facets of women’s 
empowerment and reduction in domestic violence in sub-Saharan Africa in ways that reflect the 
intrinsic differences in study design, as well as the different socio-economic contexts.  The 
IMAGE study mostly focused on the dimension empowerment related to autonomy – i.e. the 







identify the group of poorest individuals in the village (Hargreaves et al., 2007; Simanowitz and Nkuna, 1998). say. Thus, it encouraged the women to think for themselves, and see themselves as more self-
interested individuals compared with the role of women who were not in the program. The 
Burundi VSLA intervention, in contrast, focused more on the aspect of empowerment that has to 
do with positive relations with others – i.e. meaningful connections with significant others that 
are mutually enriching and constructive. These intrinsic difference explains the exclusive focus 
on women we find in IMAGE, and the inclusion of clients both genders in the Burundi VSLA, 
respectively. Further, both programs were designed to respond to the local environment they 
were introduced in, to enhance their respective salience in relation to the local context and, by 
so doing enhancing their chance of successfully achieving their stated targets. Thus, IMAGE 
was geared toward South African women in peri-urban areas, who have a tradition of joining 
women’s groups, both for economic purposes – as the presence of numerous women’s 
stokvels–locally initiated rotating savings associations indicated, and for political and social 
purposes (Bozzoli, 1990). The program in Burundi, owed its structure instead to the fact that 
IRC preferred to entertain a dialogue with both genders, in an effort to offset previous failed 
attempts that had exclusively focused on women, and in order to reduce the likelihood of 
rejection on the part of the population of an intervention that only focused on women, given the 
very conservative nature of the local culture in Burundi.  
  Summary of Comparative Measures 
Question  Burundi VSLA  South Africa IMAGE 
Household Roster (relation, age)  Y  Y 
Education Y  Y 
Displacement Y  N  /A 
Assets  Land Ownership  LO + index of hh 
durables + heads of 
cattle & other 
domestic  animals 
Consumption  Y (past 2 weeks)  N 
Who decides on a variety of issues  Y  Y 
How disputes get resolved  Y  N 
Attitudes towards women’s roles and rights  Y  Roles Only 
Controlling Behavior  N  Y 
Violence Levels   HITS Tool (past 2 
weeks) 
WHO Tool (past 12m) 
Response to Violence  N  Y 
Knowledge of & Communication on HIV  N/A  Y 




4.  METHODS  
4.1 Quantitative Data  
4.1.1 Burundi  
The evaluation relies on 4 sources of data: 1) a baseline survey conducted in January, 2008; 2) 
a post-discussion group survey conducted in July, 2008; 3) qualitative monitoring to 
complement the discussion group findings in January 2009; and 4) a final survey conducted in 
April 2009. These, together with the methods used for data analysis, are briefly described . 
 
 
 The Survey Instrument  
The three waves of survey collected data on household consumption, decision making and 
conflict resolution, gender roles, attitudes toward violence, exposure to violence, women’s 
rights. The first wave of the survey also included a household roster; while the second also 
included sections on asset ownership and income, VSLA loans and savings, and wealth and 
wellbeing. The measure of exposure to violence used in this survey is the Hurt Insult Threaten 
Scream (HITS) instrument (Sherin et al., 1998). The HITS was chosen due to its proven 
applicability in a variety of settings, and because it allows for a rapid appraisal of past 
experiences of violence. Its measurement regards the two weeks prior to the interview. The 
surveys were conducted by 12 interviewers, 4 of which were males. Each interview lasted 
approximately 30 minutes  
 
Analysis  
The data was collected in Excel spreadsheets and imported into Stata, a statistical package 
widely used for econometric analysis. We performed regression analysis on the data, using a 
‘difference in differences’ approach. This method allowed us to compare the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the relative change in the outcomes of interest experienced by the 
relevant groups as a result of the treatment, compared to the initial situation. The rigorous 
randomization design allowed us to attribute the observed changes to the intervention.  
 
4.1.2 South Africa  
The Survey Instrument  
The two waves of the IMAGE panel contained data on socio-demographics, group membership, 
community participation, household dynamics, economic well-being and shortages, HIV/AIDS 
awareness and communication, societal norms on gender roles, decision making in the 
household, intimate partner violence including controlling behavior, responses on experiences 
of abuse, and questions on loan performance for microfinance clients. Importantly, the tool that 
measures exposure to violence in the IMAGE study – based on the WHO indicators of domestic 
violence as found in the WHO multi-country study (WHO, 2005) – measured incidence over a 
period of 12 months prior to the interview. This implies that comparisons between the HITS 
results from the Burundi intervention and the tool used for IMAGE are not directly comparable. 
The measures of exposure to violence used in the two evaluations differ in terms of the time 
span they cover.  
 
The women were also administered a household questionnaire that included a household 
roster, questions on the type of the two most significant sources of income, characteristics of the 
dwelling, household assets, credits and savings, perception of own wealth, and food security. 
Questionnaires were in total about 25 pages long, and took 40 minutes to one hour to 
administer. Interviewers were all females, and during the month long training prior to the first 
wave of survey data collection they learned interviewing techniques for sensitive issues, and 
studied the questionnaire in depth.  
 
 
 Analysis  
The data was entered in Access databases, and transferred into Stata. We used the ‘difference-
in-differences’ approach in an OLS model to measure impact. We clustered the errors at the 
village level, as this was the level at which treatment was administered, and control for village 
pair effect, as these are identify geographical characteristics of relevance, as well as for a 
number of socio-demographic variables to correct for baseline imbalances.  
 
4.2 Qualitative Data  
There were important differences in the way the qualitative data were collected in South Africa 
vs. Burundi.  
 
The qualitative data from South Africa used in this study focused on the understanding of the 
women’s conception of subjective well-being (SWB) and was used to formulate initial 
hypotheses as to what aspects of SWB the objective measures of empowerment may relate to 
exposure to violence.  For the Burundi project the qualitative data were the transcripts of the 
discussion sessions. The data from Burundi was collected in a manner that could be analyzed 
statistically by the text analysis program Alceste. 
  
4.2.1 Burundi 
The Focus Group Data Collection   
Perceptions and customs around decision making within households including on daily and 
major household purchases, family planning issues and women’s ability to negotiate sex, 
domestic violence and the recent conflict between different ethnic groups were investigated in 
focus group discussions.  We used verbal descriptions to obtain answers to questions.  
 
We then analyzed the transcripts from focus group sessions to enrich and contextualize the 
interpretation of the quantitative data. In line with the underlying evaluation design, focus group 
participants were divided into focus group according to their treatment status, and further 
separated by gender, so that a total of four focus groups were run: one with treated women and 
one with non-treated women; one with treated men and one with non-treated men. One 
moderator supported by an interpreter conducted each focus group. A female moderator and 
interpreter conducted the focus groups with the women, and a male moderator and interpreter 
those with men, because it was thought this would favor a greater degree of understanding and 
trust during the sessions. At times, especially for the most delicate parts of the discussion, 
moderators and interpreters explicitly appealed to this form of trust and understanding, to 




The focus groups all had the same structure, and therefore produce information that may be 





free to express yourselves. Tell me, when a man is angry, what kind of reactions can he have?” briefly explaining the purpose of the focus group, introducing themselves, and requesting an 
informed oral consent of participants. The focus groups interactions were mainly devoted to 
obtaining answers for eight key questions, some of which were further articulated as sub-
questions or themes: the market day, joint decision making, women and their ability to manage 
money, the ethnic conflict and marital relationships, family planning, and conflict and violence 
within the household.  
 
Analysis  
The verbal material from the focus groups was analyzed with the aid of Alcesté, a software suite 
for the analysis of the content of textual data. The software applies a statistical technique called 
correspondence analysis to identify themes (technically called classes) in the text; this is done 
by computing the relative frequency and co-occurrence of different parts of speech in the text. 
By identifying those elements in the text’s vocabulary that tend to occur together, the software 
defines the key themes woven in the text itself. This technique is useful in the analysis of text 
that reports responses to open questions, as it allows us to characterize the worldviews of 
respondents associated with the prompts they were given. This feature makes Alcesté 
particularly apt for the analysis of the material from the focus groups conducted in Burundi, 
where the moderators only gave hints to introduce the themes they wanted to discuss, and let 
participants express their own personal views in their own manner on these themes. The 
software identified seven separate themes that we discuss below in conjunction with the results 
from the quantitative econometric analysis of the survey data to more fully capture the impact of 
the intervention.  
 
4.3 Comparison of Results 
The results are presented separately for our own data from Burundi and our analysis of the Kim 
et al data from South Africa. We provide the results in the immediate context of the hypotheses 
outlined above. The results are described around the three broad themes of financial decision 
making, attitudes to violence, and violence outcomes, integrating both quantitative and 
qualitative findings for Burundi. This integration allows us to provide a rigorous discussion of the 
hypotheses in light of results while contextualizing them clearly into the areas of relevance for 
policy making.  Only quantitative analysis is provided for South Africa, as Kim et al are currently 
conducting qualitative analyses of their data. 
 
The tools used in the two interventions to measure experience of domestic violence differ 
somewhat, the Burundi intervention relying on the HITS measure (Sherin et al., 1998), and the 
IMAGE intervention relying on the WHO methodology found in the WHO multi-country study on 
violence against women (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005). However slightly different, both these 
measures capture a measure of physical assault – push, and hit with a fist or object in the case 
of IMAGE; and physically hurt you, in the case of the VSLA intervention in Burundi – as well as 
a measure of insult, though the IMAGE instrument only gages whether insults are administered 
in public, and is therefore likely to capture less instances. The two measures differ in that the 
HITS measure also captures instances of threat and cases when the woman has been 
screamed at, and hence in general focuses on aggressive behavior of the man toward the 
woman broadly understood. The IMAGE tool looks explicitly as sexual violence, investigating whether the woman has been forced to have sex and/or has had sex for fear of the 
consequences, had she refused to, and also at controlling behavior more generally. In both 
cases, the choice of questions is related to the context where the interventions were introduced, 
which in turn, as we have seen, determined the nature of the interventions themselves. In the 
case of IMAGE, the choice of asking explicit questions about sexual violence may be connected 
both to the widespread incidence of sexual violence itself, and by the fact that in South Africa 
this is an issue that is openly discussed in the media, and by policy makers. In contrast the 
choice of the HITS tool – whose efficacy in detecting instances of domestic abuse is 
documented (Sherin et al., 1998) – has rather to do with the overarching spirit of the 
intervention, and the choice not to focus explicitly on domestic violence in order not to alienate 
men and the general population in the communities where it was introduced. 
  
 
5. RESULTS   
 
We report on results from our analyses of the effects of programs that couple microfinancing 
with discussion sessions in Burundi and South Africa in the areas of decision making, attitudes 
to traditional norms and violence against women, and reported exposure to violence, both in the 
form of controlling behavior on the part of men and of more direct forms of violence. The results 
are shown so as to assess the degree to which the programs have met the targets they had 
originally defined.  For each program, we first provide an overview of results to convey the 
overall impact of the program; we then evaluate the success of the randomization, in order to 
justify the econometric models, and then describe the results in relation to the hypotheses we 
formulated for the two programs. We focus on the specific indicators related to these 
hypotheses for each program and develop a comparative perspective. We discuss the common 
and discordant features of the results from the two programs.  
 
5.1. Burundi  
The VSLA microfinancing program coupled with the discussion sessions in Burundi was 
targeted at reducing male control over all household decision-making.  Included in this, was the 
goal of changed attitudes towards household violence.  If successful in execution, both men and 
women who participated in the discussion sessions will have developed a more nuanced 
understanding of domestic violence without an explicit discussion or consideration of violence.  
In particular, women who participated in the discussion sessions would be able to describe the 
elements that constitute the ‘cultural risk environment’ for domestic violence. ‘Cultural risk 
environment’ the set of criteria that identify an acceptable behavior for the woman in the 
household and that at the same time underscore her lesser stand in the negotiation of roles.  
 
In testing the impact of the Burundi program, we find that participation in the discussion groups 
is associated with increased decision making for women.  In particular, 26% more women in the 
discussion groups report an increase in spending on their own earnings.  There is no substantial 
change in decisions on how men’s income is spent.  In addition, women report increased 
decision making authority over major household purchases also increases by nearly 14%.  This 
change in decision making directly impacts household consumption with women reporting and more than 11% increase in household consumption.  Attitudes towards violence changed by 
9%., with men reporting more often that violence was unacceptable, in particular, when the wife 
is perceived as neglecting the children and when the wife refuses sex.  However, these changes 
in attitude are not reflected in substantial changes to violence exposure.  The program appears 
to reduce violence by less than 1 percent. 
 
5.1.1 Verifying Randomization 
Before considering the initial reported attitudes of VSLA participants on gender issues, we 
asked respondents detailed information about their household, including information about 
displacement, education, and wealth. This information is important from a methodological 
standpoint because it provides important information to test that discussion session participating 
and control communities are similar across a range of background variables that might shape 
the outcomes of interest or impact the efficacy of the program. In addition, the data offers a 
detailed picture of the VSLA participants many of whom are recent returnees to post ethnic-
conflict Burundi.  
 
The individuals who selected into the VSLA program were not necessarily representative of all 
Burundians About two-thirds of participants and thus roughly as many respondents are female 
(69 percent).The average age of participants is 37.9, with the youngest participants at age 15 
and the oldest at age 80.On average, respondents had 4 children living at home. The maximum 
number of children living at home is 12.Just short of two-thirds (61 percent) had young children 
(under 5) in the household. Only 2.2 percent of respondents reported never being displaced due 
to the ethnic conflict. More than half of respondents were displaced from their homes but 
remained within Burundi while 41 percent of respondents reported having to leave their homes 
and Burundi due to the ethnic conflict. A majority of participants own some land (72 percent). 
Among land owners, the average number of hectares owned by the household is 4.5 hectares. 
Approximately 61 percent of respondents had attended some primary school. Only 16 percent 
of respondents had attended secondary school.  
 
An important component in ascertaining the validity of an experiment is comparing the outcome 
variables of interest in the control and treatment groups to ensure that there are no systematic 
baseline differences. If randomization is successful then on average there should be no 
statistically detectable difference between the control and treatment groups for baseline 
variables. Confirming this, we found that almost no outcome variable recorded a statistically 
significant baseline difference between average values recorded in the participants’ and non 




[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
The only statistical difference in characteristics prior to the discussion sessions was whether the 
husband that decides how the money his wife earns is to be spent.  The discussion session 
                                                            
14 The comparison of pre‐treatment variables are shown in appendix table 1 participants reported an approximately 10% rate (that is for discussion session participants, 
more husbands decided how the money the wife earned is to be spent). This difference in one 
pre-treatment outcome is not of concern given the large number of outcome variables tested.  
Statistically, there is a 5% chance that an outcome would appear significantly different, 
consistent with our baseline results.  
 
To ensure the groups appear similar on observable characteristics we also compared socio-
demographic variables. The two groups are also similar along socio-demographic lines, with no 
variable recording a statistically significant difference between the two groups.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
In both groups, approximately 60% of respondents are females. The two groups also do not 
differ significantly in terms of amount of land owned: both spouse and respondent own on 
average 2 half hectares of land, and the majority of spouses do not own land jointly.  
 
5.1.2 Decision Making Authority  
The first objective of the Burundi program was to improve women’s participation in decision 
making.  Women’s participation in decision making in the household is generally considered as 
an important step in their emancipation. If she learns to take part in the management of 
household matters, and if her husband learns that it is useful to listen to her, this is interpreted 
to indicate a greater appreciation of the woman’s input in the household and, in turn, to lead to a 
reduced likelihood that she is subject to violence. The intervention aimed to improve decision 
making dynamics in this direction, encouraging both men and women to take increasingly more 
decisions jointly.  We identified several areas which may be critical to women’s empowerment: 




Based on this objective, hypothesis B-H1 was that female members of discussion sessions are 
more likely to be involved in increasing areas of household decision making. Men who 
participate in the discussion sessions will be more likely than those that do not to believe that 
women are capable of making decisions in a broader set of areas.  Related to this, hypothesis 
B-H2 was that members of discussion sessions would become more likely to apply negotiation 
skills during conflict to reduce the risk of arguments escalating to violence   
 
Our results show a statistically significant impact on three of the eight decision making (DM): the 
husband’s role in deciding how the wife’s money is spent; husbands deciding unilaterally on 
large purchases for the household; and husbands deciding unilaterally on how many children to 
have. In addition, all three indicators show a similar trend, with women reporting having become 
more able to co-operate.  In all three cases, the percentage increase in co-operative behavior 
among women with respect to the baseline group is 100- fold the increase reported by men in 
absolute value.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ] Tables 3 and 4 report full results for the battery of decision making indicators at baseline and 
follow-up,  Table 4 also reports the percent change in each indicator, relative to the  baseline 
levels.   The results suggest that joint decision making on large purchases improves markedly in 
the group of treated individuals—with an increase in about 15 percent for women relative to 
baseline decision making authority.. This same trend is observed for decisions on when to visit 
one’s own or one’s spouse’s family; further, the management of disagreements in these two 
areas also shows similar patterns, although these results are not statically significant. The 
results in Table 4 also suggest that negotiation skills targeted as nonviolent resolution of 
disagreements improve for women in the intervention group.  Women are 4 percent more likely 
to discuss with their husbands when they disagree with both large and daily purchases. A 
similar trend in negotiation abilities is observed for resolving disagreements in relation to visits 
to either their own or their spouse’s family.   
 
Men in the treatment group report a very small reduction in their ability to negotiate.  Although 
this effect is small in magnitude (less than 1 %) it appears consistent across various indicators 
and may be due to heightened awareness of what negotiation entails. The results are most 
pronounced on decision making on sex, and alcohol and cigarette purchases which are also the 
outcomes which had the lowest levels of co-operation as well as the areas with the largest 
influence of men in decision making.  
 
Figure 2 shows the change in whether the respondent’s partner decides how to spend 
respondent’s money: female VSLA members who were members of discussion groups reported 
a 26% increase in level of empowerment when compared to female VSLA members in the 
control group at baseline.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Men who participated in the discussion sessions, however, reported a greater degree of control 
of household money when compared to female participants at baseline, i.e. a lower tendency to 
cooperate. Though significant at the 95% level, this decrease in cooperation is 100 times 
smaller than the increase reported by the women (-0.27% on females in the control group at 
baseline; and -0.26% when compared to males in the control group at baseline)  
 
Females who participated in the discussion groups co-operate on major purchases on average 
14.26% more than the women at baseline (p<0.05), reporting an average of 2.347.Men showed 
a decrease, instead, of 0.14 percentage points in their ability to share decision making on the 
initial 2.054 average recorded by women in the control group at baseline.   
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Females who had participated in the discussion sessions recorded an increase of 0.36 points 
over females clients in control groups at baseline regarding the decision of how many children 
to have, recording a 14.12% increase from 2.542 (p<0.05). Men reported a decrease of 0.14 
percentage points on the initial value reported by women in the control group.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ]  
When considering the full range of the decision making indicators, even those that did not 
change significantly showed trends similar to the ones illustrated above. In general, the women 
report an increase in joint decision, while men report a very small (often 100-fold smaller) 
increase in their own role in household decision making.  
 
This is consistent with the evidence from the qualitative analysis.  Two themes emerged in the 
focus groups related to the economic sphere of access to and management of resources. One 
theme specifically describes the role of the woman in the management of the household. 
Typically the activities included were cleaning, making the bed, fetching water and wood, and 
preparing meals. The role of women in this area was most often associated with her 
responsibility or duty.  The related theme for men contains a very rich description of all activities 
revolving around the market, and is associated explicitly with men in their role as fathers. This is 
specifically in relation to the key role they seem to play in providing for their children’s school 
purchases. The sentences characteristic of this theme seem to report the husband is in a 
dominant position, i.e. as the one who has ultimately privilege to make decisions that revolve 
around the acquisition of resources in the market, possibly because of his more direct access to 
money.  The focus on woman’s duties in the household and her role in its management is 
associated to the discussion on the division of labor, and was largely concentrated among 
participants in the discussion sessions. In contrast, the discussion on men’s privileged access to 
the market was prevalent with both men and women who were not participants. This is 
consistent with some initial effect of the treatment in fostering a more diverse set of perceptions 
and ideas around the role of men and the household’s access to the market among treated 
individuals. This interpretation is supported by the quantitative results, where a greater degree 
of joint decision making is reported by both males and females, as opposed to the control 
groups. 
 
5.1.3 Attitudes towards Gender Norms and Violence  
A second objective of the Burundi program was to affect attitudes towards domestic violence by 
challenging traditional views of women.  The nature of the challenge was in the economic and 
decision making sphere but theory suggests that increased decision making authority may 
enhance perceptions of capability and reduce tolerance and acceptance of violence. The 
program aimed to improve attitudes in this direction, by encouraging both men and women to 
consider why conflicts arise and why such resolutions are achieved via violence rather than 
negotiation.  We identified several areas in which violence might be more or less tolerated: 
mobility, fertility, household behavior and general social/political rights.
10 Based on this 
objective, hypothesis B-H3 stated that members of the discussion groups would be more likely 
to think that abuse is never justified. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
In general, the program has a positive and statistically significant impact in the reduction of the 
tolerance of violence in 2 out of the 6 areas measured: neglecting children and refusing to have 
sex. The impact is stronger than the time trend observed in the control group in the case of kids’ neglect, and approximately the same when it comes to the refusal to have sex, though the 
estimate for the control group is more precise than that for discussion session participants. 
Moreover, the acceptance of wife beating in cases of kids neglect records an increase in 
rejection of abuse among discussion session participating women equal to 0.137 when 
compared to baseline females (23% increase), versus a negligible decrease in the rejection of 
violence on the part of discussion session participating men (-0.23%), also significant at the 
90% level. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Participants in discussion sessions are less likely to accept violence for indiscriminate reasons 
and, in particular, if women go out without saying, argue with their husband, burn food, or say 
something annoying. Female participants in the discussion sessions are less likely to accept 
violence against women if they say something annoying or for indiscriminate reasons. Unlike for 
the cases of neglect of kids and refusal to have sex, the change in these other dimensions is 
however not statistically significant with respect to levels of acceptance recorded by females at 
baseline for discussion sessions participants. 
 
The control group recorded statistically significant reductions in the tolerance of violence if the 
wife goes out without letting her husband know, argues with him, neglects the kids, refuses sex 
or burns food.  In all these cases, trends are identical in both groups and for both genders 
across groups, with a change of approximately the same order of magnitude for women in the 
intervention and control groups in relation to arguments.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Moreover, the control group recorded a statistically significant opposite shift in views between 
males and females: female clients see it as less acceptable that wives be beaten, while men 
see it as more acceptable. The discussion session participants recorded a similar trend; in both 
cases, the absolute difference in change is very large (about 100-fold). 
 
5.1.4 Exposure to Violence  
The ultimate objective of the program was to reduce women’s exposure to violence.  Rather 
than approach the norms that affect violence directly, the program in Burundi was based on the 
theory that improving women’s authority over household decisions could challenge the norms 
that enable violence, thus reducing violence.  Based on this theory, B-H4 was that the program 
reduces the prevalence of domestic violence. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE ] 
 
Table 6 presents the impact of the program on reported violence.  It appears that females that 
did not participate in the discussion sessions reported a reduction in the levels of violence in all 
areas except for the experience of threats.  Males who did not participate in the discussion 
sessions reported an increase in the level of violence imposed on their partners with respect to the levels control women reported at baseline, and virtually unchanged from their own report at 
baseline (conditional average was 1.20 at baseline and is 1.19 at follow up). 
 
Females in the control group reported a statistically significant reduction in the experience of 
violence at the end of the savings cycle, i.e. when they receive their total savings back, 
suggesting that the actual access to the savings makes a difference. However, males in this 
group reported increasing levels of violence in time, and especially once they receive their 
savings, suggesting that increased access to material resources may induce men to inflict more 
violence. 
Across individuals in the discussion sessions, there is an overall reduction in violence for 
women. Similarly, men kept reporting higher levels of violence, just as their non-participating 
counterparts however, the increase is much lower among those in the discussion session than 
the levels reported by men in the control group.  Thus while there may have been a secular 
trend of violence increasing (perhaps due to other environmental factors), the effect of this 
increase is subdued among discussion session participants. 
 
Female participants exhibit a similar reduction in the exposure to violence both immediately 
after the discussion sessions and after receiving their savings. Treated men, like their untreated 
counterparts, still report stepping up the violence; in this case, however, the increase is much 
lower and no longer statistically significant. This seems to suggest that while increased access 
to resources does encourage violence among men, partaking in activities designed to increase 
their awareness of the importance of negotiation encourages them to resort to violence less 
frequently than they would otherwise do. 
 
It is critical to note that while Table 6 shows an overall reduced exposure to violence for women 
in both the intervention and control group, the self-reports may be affected directly by the 
program.  Evidence from Jewkes (1999) shows evidence that women tend to report lower 
reductions in experienced violence after increased awareness about domestic violence because 
they are more likely to categorize events as violence relative to their less-aware counterparts.  
This has been consistently documented over a range of other studies.  Men in the control group 
report increases in violence across the board, significant in all cases except for threatening 
behavior. Men in the intervention group instead report a more mixed picture, though the 
changes they report are never statistically significant. In the focus groups men show a finer 
understanding of the issues around domestic violence; hence, these mixed results may be 
interpreted as further corroborating the hypothesis that they have developed a clearer 
understanding of domestic violence.  The reported increase may indicate an ability to distinguish 
improvements in one area from a worsening situation in another. 
 
The analysis of focus group data revealed two themes of discussion related to household 
violence.  The first may be labeled ‘modes of violence’, as it contains words that refer to the type 
of violence inflicted on the women. This is mostly reported to be of a physical nature, with 
effects both psychological and physical on the victim. The main violent acts are beating, 
insulting, threatening in order of importance. An important form of physical violence that differs 
from other areas is burning and scorching which both men and women report. This seems to be consistent with conflict related dynamics previously identified in the academic literature.  In 
general, the verbs characterizing this theme are verbs of active aggression: beat, burn, hurt. 
The preposition ‘against’ is also typical of this theme, further indicating an antagonistic 
interaction. The juxtaposition of the language of ‘psychological’ versus ‘physical’, suggests that 
violence is not only perceived as physical and there is a sense of what is cause of psychological 
violence.
15 Words that refer to feelings associated to this theme are ‘anger’ or ‘mood’ in relation 
to the man and ‘frustration’ and ‘abused’ associated to the woman.
16   
. 
Though the focus group data illustrated an enhanced ability to identify and categorize 
antagonistic physical abuse, it is particularly associated to the focus group run with men that 
had participated in the program. This is consistent with a greater awareness of domestic 
violence, and in particular the ability to recognize it and describe its different facets, as well as 
the implications it has for the victims. This, coupled with lower – though small in magnitude – 
reported threatening and insulting behavior in this group, suggests the participant group may 
have had some initial impact on the men’s perception of what is acceptable and hence on their 
behavior. 
 
A second issue identified in the focus group is the acceptability of some forms of physical 
violence. Thus violence associated with aggressive behavior on the part of the man, and in 
particular violence initiated because of changes in his mood is considered distinct relative to 
violence instigated by the wife’s behavior or the general social conditions. The nature of 
violence is most often categorized as reasonable versus unreasonable rather than existing or 
not. There is a general attitude which tolerates some motivations for violence as “reasonable” 
while others are considered inappropriate or mistreatment.  The unreasonable and 
unpredictable nature of male violence is typically associated with the language of 
powerlessness by the women. Consistent with this, attitudes described are aggressiveness on 
the part of the man, while submissiveness and politeness are associated to the woman. 
 
5.2 South Africa  
The microcredit program coupled with the discussion sessions in South Africa was targeted at 
identifying harmful gender norms with the objective of reducing violence. Included in the gender 
issues considered were cultural norms, domestic violence, sexuality, and HIV/AIDS status in 
addition to broader skill such as communication, conflict resolution, solidarity, leadership. The 
discussion sessions in South Africa were only for women.  If successful in execution, women 
who participated in the discussion sessions would develop a better understanding of domestic 










means precisely irritable, irascible or, more commonly, angry. not explicitly targeted at other spheres of influence, the more general skills could be adapted to 
a range of other circumstance to more broadly increase women’s decision making authority at 
home. 
 
In testing the impact of the South Africa program, we find that participation in the discussion 
sessions reduced experience of violence in the previous year among women, compared to 
women in the control group by 23%.  There is no substantial change in decisions on household 
spending or purchases.  Attitudes towards gender norms and violence did change with 
substantial, nearly 50 percent, increases in willingness to request condom use.  There was no 
significant change in attitudes towards violence 
 
5.2.1 Verifying Randomization  
The IMAGE program in South Africa used a village cluster design to randomize.  Assuming the 
clustering achieved randomization, we would expect no significant difference in pre-program 
outcome measures   
 [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Among the baseline measures of the outcomes we investigated (presented in Table 7), only 
three record differences between the discussion participant and the non-participant groups at or 
below the 5% significance level. One of these is from the group of indicators that measure 
attitudes to social norms: women in the non-participant group revealed themselves as more 
progressive than women in the discussion sessions, disagreeing on average more with the 
proposition that women should do all household chores; they also reported a more progressive 
attitude of the partner in relation to the woman’s seeking health care for herself: the partners of 
women in the control group are on average reported as expecting to ask for permission less 
often than the partners of the women in the intervention group. However, women in the control 
group disagree more at baseline with the proposition that the wives are entitled to refuse sex if 
they are worried that their partner may have AIDS. As in the case of Burundi, given the large 
number of outcomes considered, it is not surprising to find a few cases of statistical differences 
at baseline. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 8 presents the comparison of socio-demographic characteristics of individuals in the 
IMAGE study.  Of those characteristics considered, parity, access to sanitation in the house and 
access to electricity differ at the 5% level of significance between participant and non-participant 
group. We also consider the degree of connectedness as a proxy for baseline levels of 
entrepreneurship and initiative the women display. We measured connectedness as a count of 
the associations the women report being a member of at baseline. Connectedness does differ 
significantly between the two groups at the 1% level. To address baseline differences, we 
controlled for these variables in our regressions, in order to correct for these baseline 
differences between the two groups 
 
 5.2.2 Decision Making Authority  
Although the IMAGE intervention was targeted at gender roles and violence, the authors posited 
that such a directed program might have broader impacts on the role of women in the 
household.  The hypothesis in SA-H1 was that women participating in the program would be 
more likely to participate in decision making in the household relative to women in control 
groups. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results for decision making in South Africa are presented in Table 9.  The decision making 
indicators often indicate a tendency towards increased decision making authority among 
discussion session participations but nearly all indicators are insignificant. The only indicators 
that mark a statistically significant positive change are the one capturing medium purchases for 
the home and the degree of controls the husband exerts over the money the respondent earns.  
Women appear to increase a decision making authority relative to the non-participant group 
baseline level. However, there appears to be no substantial difference in the post-program 
levels in the control and treatment group.  Thus while decision making authority does appear to 
improve, it is ambiguous the extent to which such change is due to the IMAGE program rather 
than other environmental factors.   
 
5.2.3 Attitudes towards Gender Norms and Violence  
The primary target of the IMAGE study was to affect the set of gender norms and cultural 
practices that facilitate violence against women.  Specifically, hypothesis SA-H2 was that 
women participating in the IMAGE program are more likely to exhibit gender norms that are 
more favorable for women. 
 
Table 10 presents the results of the IMAGE program on attitudes toward gender norms shows 
that women in the treatment group are less likely to accept gender norms biased against 
women. In particular, treatment group participations are 12-15 percent more likely to reject 
tradition roles for women (e.g. women do all the household chores, obey if husband paid 
brideprice).  Effects on attitudes towards fidelity and sex are much larger, showing a near 50 
percent change.  Subsequent to participation in discussion sessions, women become less 
tolerant of the husbands’ other girlfriends, and are more open to the possibility of divorce, 
compared to control women at baseline, albeit none of the latter three changes reaches 
statistical significance. This is consistent women also being less likely to think that it is 
acceptable for a woman to refuse to have sex with her partner if he does not want to use a 
condom. Areas specifically targeted by the program do show substantial changes after the 
program.  There is a 63 percent decline among participants who believe women can refuse sex 
if her husband refuses to wear a condom and a 50 percent decline in women believing that 
requesting her husband to use a condom indicates the woman is having an affair. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 The measures of the acceptability of the husband’s beating his wife were only measured at 
follow up for IMAGE. They depict a mixed picture, with women who participated in discussion 
sessions becoming less willing to accept that men beat their wife because she does not want to 
have sex or because she may be unfaithful; however, treated women become more likely to 
accept that a man beat his wife because she asks him to use a condom, or because she 
disagrees publicly with him. Overall the evidence on attitudes towards violence indicate only 
limited changes many of which are not statistically significant. 
 
5.2.4 Exposure to Violence  
The primary objective of the program was to reduce women’s exposure to domestic violence.  In 
contrast to the Burundi study, the IMAGE program was specifically targeted at reducing 
violence. As a result, the intervention was expected to substantially reduce violence.  The 
specific hypothesis stated in SA- H3 was that women in the IMAGE program would be more 
likely to experience a reduction in the exposure to violence.  Overall the results appear 
consistent with this hypothesis: the IMAGE intervention reduced violence among discussion 
series participants by 38% relative to the control group experienced at baseline, conditional on 
baseline values of women’s parity, connectedness, and access to drinking water and sanitation. 
Compared to their own level at baseline, these women experienced a 34% reduction in the 
experience of violence. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Breaking down the aggregate measure in its components, we observe that women in the control 
group also experienced a statistically significant reduction in the incidence of physical assault – 
both in the form of their partner hitting them with a fist or an object; and of her pushing or 
shoving them. the third component of our aggregate measure of violence – experience of sexual 
assault in the form of forced sex – was also reduced, albeit not to a statistically significant 
extent. Finally, we included among the indicators of violence the measure of insult contained in 
the IMAGE survey that in fact here belongs to another group of indicators, and namely those 
aimed at detecting controlling behavior. The results are presented in Table 11. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Much of the violence reduction seems to come from declines in physical violence.  To facilitate 
comparison to the Burundi results, we include a measure of ‘insults’ from the South Africa 
violence measurement tool.  This is similar to the HITS indicator that was used in Burundi. In 
light of this, it is important to note that the question in the IMAGE questionnaire is worded 
slightly differently from the HITS questionnaire, asking as it does whether the respondent has 
been insulted or humiliated by her partner in public, rather than more generally insulted. Hence, 
for the same individual, the IMAGE question would elicits responses that are only a subset of 
the instances captured by the HITS indicator in Burundi. There is a marginal increase in the rate 
of insults among participants although there was an increase among the control group as well.  
This may suggest that violence shifted from physical to verbal after the intervention.  It is important to note, however, that like in the case of Burundi, this may be because of differences 




The interventions we have studied here constitute two of the first randomized evaluations of the 
impact of microfinance products on domestic violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Concentrating only 
on female users, IMAGE explores the impact of the introduction of a microfinance and training 
product in a new market.  The Burundi VSLA investigation explores the impact of training skills 
on a population that has self-selected for receiving microfinance services. Both programs 
sought to enhance women’s decision making power, reduce acceptance of gendered social 
norms which facilitate domestic violence against women, and reduce exposure to such violence.  
The emphasis of the programs however differed in two key dimensions: first, the IMAGE 
program focused only on women while the Burundi program included both women and men.  
Second, the IMAGE program specifically targeted gender norms and violence while the Burundi 
program discussed household economic matters and issues in an effort to highlight and 
challenge traditional norms. 
 
We find that both interventions had impacts on a range of desired indictors. In South Africa the 
IMAGE program is associated with a substantial decline in violence, and some changes in 
tolerance of gender-specific norms which facilitate violence. However, IMAGE appears to have 
had only limited impact on enhancing the role of women in decision making authority in the 
household.  In Burundi on the other hand, there was substantial changes in household decision 
making authority over purchases and even fertility decisions by women but limited impact on 
decision making about sex. There were marginal changes in acceptability of violence. Violence 
was categorized in reasonable and unreasonable dimensions consistent with existing attitudes 
prevalent in Burundi. There were only marginal and often insignificant changes in exposure of 
women to domestic violence in Burundi. The findings suggest that discussion groups in 
conjunction with VSLA may empower women by increasing decision making authority over 
household purchases. The evidence suggests a trend towards potentially important 
improvements in reducing domestic violence. Beating one’s wife, together with insulting and 
threatening her, seem to be the most common forms of violence. While, within the relatively 
brief study period physical violence did not significantly decrease, insults did, which may 
indicate reduced levels of violence and abuse within the household in the future.  
 
Together these studies suggest a few key take-home messages: First, programs which target 
violence and do not incur backlash from the community may reduce exposure to violence (as in 
the case of South Africa). Second, in areas where it is infeasible to introduce gender-specific 
programming on violence, programs on economic factors may improve decision making 
authority and may aid in reducing violence, albeit to a lesser degree.  Third, targeted programs 
tend to impact the areas in which they are targeted, whether that target is violence or economic 
decisions. Spillover effects to related areas appear to be insignificant.  As a result, policy 
makers should be careful in assuming that limited programs will have broad effects across 
areas of decision making.    
The central message that emerges from both studies is that long-term (~5 -10 year) prospective 
studies are needed to assess the real efficacy of discussion group based interventions.  Of 
critical importance is an assessment of whether impacts are permanent or decay over time and 
if periodic reinforcement help. The quantitative evidence indicate that in Burundi the greatest 
change in attitudes takes place in the management and access to resources, while in South 
Africa it is on violence. It should be noted that these results are not directly comparable, 
because of the different sub-populations the two interventions compare; it is however of interest 
to note that, in relation to the array of results both interventions measure, it is those they 
targeted most directly that record the greatest impact, at least in the short term. In both cases, 
longer term evaluations are warranted. Programs and evaluations should be designed to serve 
the purpose of assessing whether these initial results are maintained and broader effects in 
other areas reinforce the set of intended impacts. 
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Notes:  Outcome  measures  based  on  survey  data  collected  by  Intervention  with  Microfinance  for 
Gender Equity (IMAGE) in South Africa, a cooperative study between the London School of Hygiene and 








   Participants  Non Participants  Comparison 
N  Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD  t  Diff  %Chng 
Panel A: Violence Outcomes  
Woman has been Physically Hurt  184  1.207   0.534  154    1.20  0.46 ‐ 0.217 0.01  1.01 
Woman has been Insulted  184  1.728   1.004  154    1.81  1.05  0.744 ‐0.08  0.95 
Woman has been Threatened  184  1.245   0.693  154    1.35  0.79  1.301 ‐0.11  0.92 
Woman has been screamed at  184  2.087   1.057  154    2.23  1.05  1.223 ‐0.14  0.94 
Total HIT Score  184  6.266   2.515  154    6.58  2.54  1.152 ‐0.32  0.95 
Total HIT Score greater than 5  184  0.250   0.434  154    0.32  0.47  1.38 ‐0.07  0.79 
Total HIT Score Females' Reports Only   119  6.345   2.857   99    6.48  2.72  0.344 ‐0.13  0.98 
Total HIT Score Females' Only> 5  119  0.269   0.445   99    0.31  0.47  0.712 ‐0.04  0.86 
Panel B: Decision Making Outcomes  
How Money is Spent: Spouse Decides   246  2.09  1.24  209    2.34  1.21  2.093 ‐0.24  0.90 
Spend Money Disagree: Spouse Changes  206  4.272   1.231  161    4.05  1.32 ‐ 1.646 0.22  1.05 
Daily hh Purchases Spouse Decides   243  2.313   1.088  199    2.20  1.04 ‐ 1.152 0.12  1.05 
Daily hh Purchases Disagree: Spouse Changes  206  4.311   1.177  158    4.23  1.16 ‐ 0.619 0.08  1.02 
Large hh Purchases Spouse Decides   244  2.053   1.264  201    2.02  1.15 ‐ 0.291 0.03  1.02 
Large hh Purchases Disagree: Spouse Changes  205  4.200   1.326  159    4.14  1.33 ‐ 0.439 0.06  1.01 
Alcohol/Cigarettes Spouse Decides  173  1.705   1.000  140    1.76  1.02  0.513 ‐0.06  0.97 
Alcohol/Cigarettes Disagree: Spouse Changes  138  3.667   1.577  104    3.52  1.55 ‐ 0.728 0.15  1.04 
When to Visit Family & Friends ‐ Spouse 
Decides   241  2.672   1.296  202    2.52  1.21 ‐ 1.322 0.16  1.06 
When to Visit Family & Friends Disagree: 
Spouse Changes  189  4.349   1.155  155    4.20  1.22 ‐ 1.153 0.15  1.04 
When to Visit Spouse's Family & Friends ‐ 
Spouse Decides   220  2.691   1.305  184    2.53  1.21 ‐ 1.261 0.16  1.06 
When to Visit Family & Friends Disagree: 
Spouse Changes  180  4.567   0.922  142    4.42  1.07 ‐ 1.272 0.14  1.03 
How Many Kids Spouse Decides  128  2.602   1.433   97    2.81  1.40  1.117 ‐0.21  0.92 
Have Sex Spouse Decides  194  1.938   1.318  142    1.89  1.24 ‐ 0.361 0.05  1.03 When to Visit Family & Friends Disagree: 
Spouse Changes  110  4.555   0.982   82    4.26  1.26 ‐ 1.784 0.30  1.07 
Panel C: Attitudes to Women and Violence  
Women should do as Men Say  257  2.202   0.571  225    2.13  0.56 ‐ 1.418 0.07  1.03 
Wife should give money she earns to husband  257  2.525   0.587  225    2.60  0.55  1.441 ‐0.08  0.97 
Okay for husband to abandon wife if he wants  257  2.467   0.599  225    2.45  0.63 ‐ 0.241 0.01  1.01 
Woman's job to gather water, even if unsafe  257  2.486   0.560  225    2.45  0.54 ‐ 0.658 0.03  1.01 
Women cannot manage money  256  2.879   0.350  225    2.89  0.34  0.46 ‐0.01  1.00 
Women should have sex when husband wants  256  2.555   0.636  222    2.50  0.71 ‐ 0.953 0.06  1.02 
Women should have as many kids as husband 
wants  256  2.773   0.759  222    2.66  0.75 ‐ 1.611 0.11  1.04 
Okay to beat wife if goes out w/out telling 
husband  254  1.630   0.484  223    1.58  0.50 ‐ 1.145 0.05  1.03 
Okay to beat wife if neglects kids  257  1.455   0.499  224    1.48  0.50  0.491 ‐0.02  0.98 
Okay to beat wife if argues w/ husband  254  1.736   0.442  221    1.74  0.44  0.145 ‐0.01  1.00 
Okay to beat wife if refuses sex  249  1.707   0.456  216    1.74  0.44  0.702 ‐0.03  0.98 
Okay to beat wife if burns food  257  1.887   0.317  223    1.89  0.31  0.182 ‐0.00  1.00 
Okay to beat wife if does something annoying  256  1.859   0.348  223    1.87  0.33  0.484 ‐0.02  0.99 
Okay to beat wife for any reason  257  1.864   0.344  224    1.89  0.31  0.974 ‐0.03  0.98 
Never okay to beat wife  255  1.525   0.500  222    1.53  0.50  0.033 ‐0.00  1.00 
Panel D: Consumption  
Weekly Consumption (value)  241   13,379.3  15,372.22  200   11,291.93  11,592.24 ‐ 1.624  2,087.33  1.18 
Weekly Self‐production (value)  192   5,646.2  6,140.84  150    4,901.47   4,689.70 ‐ 1.272 744.73  1.15 
Yearly Consumption (value)  257  1,360,000 1,630,000  226   1,140,000 1,500,000 ‐ 1.524  220,000.  1.19 
Rights for women to own and inherit land  257   0.9   1.23  224    0.74  0.72 ‐ 1.661 0.15  1.20 
Women reps in reconstruction programs  257   1.0 ‐   ‐   224    1.00  ‐‐  ‐‐  ‐‐  ‐‐ 
Women reps in local community meetings  257   1.0   0.50  224    0.99  0.09 ‐ 1.261 0.04  1.04 







   Participants  Non Participants  Comparison 
Variable  N  Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD  t  Diff        %Change 
Males  257 0.401 0.491 226 0.336  0.473 ‐1.468 0.065 0.16
Age  256 39 12.395 226 37  13.209 ‐1.31 1.534 0.04
Respondents' Level of schooling  174 0.897 0.305 148 0.892  0.312 ‐0.135 0.005 0.01
Spouse's Level of Schooling  137 0.912 0.284 116 0.905  0.294 ‐0.198 0.007 0.01
Displaced  254 0.996 0.063 222 0.995  0.067 ‐0.095 0.001 0.00
Displaced outside Burundi  239 0.402 0.491 207 0.391  0.489 ‐0.223 0.011 0.03
Respondent Half Hectares  175 2.061 1.617 149 1.935  1.666 ‐0.688 0.126 0.06
Spouse's Half Hectares  115 1.935 1.427 93 1.949  1.726 0.063 ‐0.014 ‐0.01
Use Others' Land  129 0.744 0.438 109 0.761  0.428 0.307 ‐0.017 ‐0.02
Respondent & Spouse Own Land 









   females  males  females  males 
Panel A: Decision Making Authority over Household Decisions      
How money you earn is spent  2.276***  0.0790 ‐ 0.247**  0.00247** 
  (0.128)  (0.0826)  (0.117)  (0.00118) 
Major household purchases  2.054***  0.136*  0.0186 ‐ 0.000184 
  (0.0897)  (0.0786)  (0.0858)  (0.000866) 
Daily household purchases  2.213*** ‐ 0.0712  0.112 ‐ 0.00113 
  (0.0892)  (0.0621)  (0.0919)  (0.000925) 
Purchases of alcohol and cigarettes  1.725***  ‐0.151*  ‐0.0449  0.000459 
  (0.0752)  (0.0812)  (0.0863)  (0.000870) 
Visits your family or friends  2.393***  0.121  0.145 ‐ 0.00152 
  (0.109)  (0.0919)  (0.0977)  (0.000992) 
Visits your spouse's family or friends  2.442***  0.114*  0.131 ‐ 0.00134 
  (0.0988)  (0.0625)  (0.0810)  (0.000812) 
How many children to have  2.542***  0.331*** ‐ 0.137  0.00138 
  (0.146)  (0.111)  (0.102)  (0.00102) 
When to have sex  1.649***  0.556***  0.0212 ‐ 0.000201 
  (0.0978)  (0.0738)  (0.0913)  (0.000913) 
Panel B: Dispute Resolution over Disagreements on Household Decisions (No dispute because Spouse knows better) 
Disagree w spouse on how money is spent  4.074***  0.137  0.210** ‐ 0.00212** 
  (0.136)  (0.0953)  (0.101)  (0.00102) 
Disagree w spouse on major hh purchases  4.159***  0.150  0.0540 ‐ 0.000561 
  (0.161)  (0.0906)  (0.126)  (0.00127) 
Disagree w spouse on daily hh purchases  4.175***  0.259**  0.0539 ‐ 0.000562 
  (0.135)  (0.111)  (0.122)  (0.00123) 
Disagree w spouse on purchases of alcohol and cigarettes  3.639*** ‐ 0.315**  0.123 ‐ 0.00124 
  (0.115)  (0.145)  (0.156)  (0.00156) 
Disagree w spouse on visit your spouse's family or friends  4.387***  0.200***  0.119 ‐ 0.00119   (0.0996)  (0.0607)  (0.0936)  (0.000951) 
Disagree w spouse on visit your family or friends  4.243***  0.130  0.141 ‐ 0.00143 
  (0.113)  (0.0919)  (0.138)  (0.00138) 
Disagree on having sex  4.144*** ‐ 0.293***  0.275** ‐ 0.00275** 








   females  males  females  males 
Panel A: Decision Making Authority over Household Decisions (=1 if Respondents decide alone) 
How money you earn is spent ‐ 0.00272  4.37e‐05  0.602*** ‐ 0.00605*** 
  (0.0817)  (0.000822)  (0.138)  (0.00138) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 0.01%  0.00%  26.45%*** ‐ 0.27%*** 
         
Major hh purchases  0.106 ‐ 0.00104  0.293** ‐ 0.00293** 
  (0.0942)  (0.000938)  (0.119)  (0.00120) 
% change (relative to female baseline)  5.16% ‐ 0.05%  14.26%** ‐ 0.14%*** 
         
Daily hh purchases  0.0818 ‐ 0.000803  0.0927 ‐ 0.000924 
  (0.0770)  (0.000776)  (0.115)  (0.00116) 
% change (relative to female baseline)  3.70% ‐ 0.04%  4.19% ‐ 0.04% 
         
Purchases of alcohol and cigarettes  0.0132 ‐ 0.000103  0.0156 ‐ 0.000158 
  (0.0860)  (0.000866)  (0.127)  (0.00128) 
% change (relative to female baseline)  0.90% ‐ 0.01%  0.90% ‐ 0.01% 
         
Visit your family or friends  0.232** ‐ 0.00232**  0.0836 ‐ 0.000772 
  (0.0961)  (0.000962)  (0.144)  (0.00145) 
% change (relative to female baseline)  9.69%** ‐ 0.10%**  3.49% ‐ 0.32% 
         
Visit your spouse's family or friends ‐ 0.0367  0.000351  0.0563 ‐ 0.000525 
  (0.0776)  (0.000787)  (0.0900)  (0.000913) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 1.50%  0.01%  2.31% ‐ 0.02% 
         
How many children to have ‐ 0.147**  0.00149**  0.359*** ‐ 0.00359*** 
  (0.0639)  (0.000645)  (0.108)  (0.00109) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 5.78%**  0.06%**  14.12%*** ‐ 0.14%*** 
         
Having sex  0.0118 ‐ 0.000115  0.104 ‐ 0.00102   (0.0748)  (0.000750)  (0.0949)  (0.000954) 
% change (relative to female baseline)  0.72% ‐ 0.01%  6.31% ‐ 0.06% 
Panel B: Dispute Resolution over Disagreements on Household Decisions (=1 if there was no dispute because respondent feels  spouse knows better) 
Disagree w spouse on major hh purchases  0.183  0.00104  0.183 ‐ 0.00184 
  (0.135)  (0.00152)  (0.135)  (0.00135) 
% change (relative to female baseline)  4.40%  0.03%  4.40% ‐ 0.04% 
         
Disagree w spouse on how money is spent ‐ 0.00814  8.84e‐05 ‐ 0.00253  3.37e‐05 
  (0.139)  (0.00139)  (0.147)  (0.00148) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 0.20%  0.00% ‐ 0.06%  0.00% 
         
Disagree w spouse on daily hh purchases  ‐0.213*  0.00216*  0.0474 ‐ 0.000477 
  (0.109)  (0.00110)  (0.119)  (0.00119) 
% change (relative to female baseline)  ‐5.10%*  0.05%*  1.14% ‐ 0.01% 
         
Disagree w spouse on purchases of alcohol and cigarettes ‐ 0.0731  0.000747 ‐ 0.0404  0.000406 
  (0.125)  (0.00124)  (0.209)  (0.00209) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 2.01%  0.02% ‐ 1.11%  0.01% 
         
Disagree w spouse on visit your family or friends ‐ 0.0341  0.000367  0.0658 ‐ 0.000667 
  (0.108)  (0.00109)  (0.165)  (0.00165) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 0.80%  0.01%  1.55% ‐ 0.02% 
         
Disagree w spouse on visit your spouse's family or friends  0.124 ‐ 0.00126  0.0154 ‐ 0.000174 
  (0.0891)  (0.000902)  (0.109)  (0.00111) 
% change (relative to female baseline)  2.83% ‐ 0.03%  0.35%  0.00% 
         
Disagree on having sex ‐ 0.868***  0.00876*** ‐ 0.0710  0.000688 
  (0.133)  (0.00134)  (0.148)  (0.00149) 








  females males females males
Panel A: Baseline 
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife  1.475*** 0.176*** 0.0476 ‐0.000490
if she goes out without her husband’s permission (0.0375) (0.0281) (0.0432) (0.000437)
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she neglects kids 1.390*** 0.189*** ‐0.0262 0.000271
  (0.0459) (0.0302) (0.0449) (0.000451)
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she argues  1.724*** 0.0478** ‐0.00899 0.000106
  (0.0387) (0.0223) (0.0467) (0.000473)
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she refuses sex 1.668*** 0.124*** ‐0.0328 0.000335
  (0.0345) (0.0268) (0.0387) (0.000393)
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she burns food 0.203** ‐0.00739 ‐0.0525 0.000535
  (0.0797) (0.0173) (0.0653) (0.000666)
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she annoying 1.854*** 0.0540*** ‐0.0160 0.000158
  (0.0199) (0.0160) (0.0354) (0.000357)
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife for any reason 1.866*** 0.0385* ‐0.0292 0.000297
  (0.0239) (0.0190) (0.0328) (0.000332)
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife that it’s never ok to beat 
wife 
1.617*** ‐0.0986** ‐0.00332 3.49e‐05
  (0.0421) (0.0398) (0.0556) (0.000561)
Panel B: Post‐Program  
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife  0.187*** ‐0.00191*** 0.0223 ‐0.000222
if she goes out without her husband’s permission (0.0384) (0.000390) (0.0380) (0.000386)
% change (relative to female baseline)  12.68%*** ‐0.13%*** 1.51% ‐0.02%
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she neglects kids 0.141*** ‐0.00143*** 0.130** ‐0.00132**
  (0.0398) (0.000404) (0.0533) (0.000538)% change (relative to female baseline)  10.14%*** ‐0.10%*** 9.35% ‐0.09%
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she argues  0.127*** ‐0.00129*** 0.0275 ‐0.000295
.  (0.0343) (0.000345) (0.0478) (0.000483)
% change (relative to female baseline)  7%*** 0%*** 2% ‐0.02%
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she refuses sex 0.101*** ‐ 0.00102*** 0.0661* ‐0.000674*
  (0.0247)  (0.000250) (0.0341) (0.000347)
% change (relative to female baseline)  6%*** ‐ 0.06%*** 4%* ‐0.04%*
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she burns food 0.0570** ‐ 0.000580** 0.0166 ‐0.000169
  (0.0219)  (0.000223) (0.0307) (0.000312)
% change (relative to female baseline)  3%** ‐ 0.03%** 0.89% ‐9.02296E‐05
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife if she annoying 0.0325 ‐ 0.000333 0.0495 ‐0.000496
  (0.0259)  (0.000262) (0.0460) (0.000463)
% change (relative to female baseline)  1.75% ‐ 0.02% 2.67% ‐0.03%
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife for any reason 0.0265 ‐ 0.000265 0.0334 ‐0.000346
  (0.0232)  (0.000236) (0.0355) (0.000361)
% change (relative to female baseline)  1.41% ‐ 0.01% 1.77% ‐0.02%
= 1 if Agree that it’s acceptable to beat ones wife that it’s never ok to beat 
wife 
‐0.0848**  0.000863** ‐0.0185 0.000182
  (0.0373)  (0.000377) (0.0566) (0.000571)









  females  males  females  males 
Panel A: Baseline      
Physically Hurt  1.185***  0.011  0.015  0.000 
  (0.0320)  (0.0185)  (0.0359)  (0.000363) 
Insult  1.821*** ‐ 0.217*** ‐ 0.044  0.000 
  (0.0731)  (0.0415)  (0.0656)  (0.000663) 
Threaten  1.350*** ‐ 0.131*** ‐ 0.069  0.000676 
  (0.0575)  (0.0392)  (0.0504)  (0.0392) 
Scream  2.144*** ‐ 0.131 ‐ 0.082  0.001 
  (0.0759)  (0.0514)  (0.0734)  (0.000740) 
tothit>5  0.304*** ‐ 0.0685*** ‐ 0.0424  0.000424 
.  (0.0336)  (0.0180)  (0.0341)  (0.000342) 
Panel B: Post Program      
Physically Hurt ‐ 0.09***  0.001*** ‐ 0.0385  0.000399 
  (0.0232)  (0.000233)  (0.0356)  (0.000360) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 0.08***  0.001*** ‐ 0.032  0.000 
Insult ‐ 0.15***  0.00152** ‐ 0.0573 ‐ 0.00122 
  (0.000663)  (0.000675)  (0.0912)  (0.00148) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 0.08***  0.001** ‐ 0.031  0.001 
Threaten ‐ 0.03  0.000  0.005 ‐ 0.0000432 
.  (0.0437)  (0.000446)  (0.0504)  (0.000541) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 0.02  0.000 ‐ 0.0685  0.000 
Scream ‐ 0.22***  0.002*** ‐ 0.019  0.000191 
  (0.0743)  (0.000754)  (0.0907)  (0.000918) 
% change (relative to female baseline) ‐ 0.10***  0.001*** ‐ 0.009  8.90858E‐05 
tothit>5 ‐ 0.08  0.000836**  0.00999 ‐ 0.000273 
  (0.0300)  (0.000302)  (0.0450)  (0.000454) 






   Non‐Participants  Participants  Summary  
   N  Mean SD  N  Mean  SD  t Diff %Chng
Panel A: Violence   
Total Violence (Push, Hit, Forcesex)  178 0.163 0.593 193 0.187  0.609 ‐0.378 ‐0.024 1.145
Insulted by partner ‐ Past Year Experience  178 0.899 0.302 193 0.87  0.337 0.856 0.028 0.968
Pushed by partner ‐ Past Year Experience  178 0.067 0.251 193 0.083  0.276 ‐0.565 ‐0.015 1.23
Partner hit w\fist ‐ Past Year Experience  178 0.051 0.22 193 0.067  0.251 ‐0.687 ‐0.017 1.332
Had forced sex w\partner ‐ Past Year Experience  178 0.045 0.208 193 0.036  0.187 0.421 0.009 0.807
Had sex for fear of reprisal‐ Past Year Experience  178 0.045 0.208 193 0.036  0.187 0.421 0.009 0.807
Panel B: Decision Making  
Large purchases self, ask partner  178 0.225 0.419 190 0.237  0.426 ‐0.275 ‐0.012 1.054
Small purchases household, ask partner  178 0.781 0.415 190 0.847  0.361 ‐1.636 ‐0.066 1.085
Medium purchases household, ask partner  176 0.426 0.496 189 0.36  0.481 1.296 0.066 0.844
Large Purchases household, ask partner   178 0.152 0.36 190 0.105  0.308 1.326 0.046 0.694
Visit family of birth, ask partner   178 0.354 0.48 189 0.265  0.442 1.853 0.089 0.747
Visit friends in the village, ask partner   178 0.601 0.491 189 0.577  0.495 0.474 0.024 0.959
Visit family or friends outside village, ask partner   178 0.236 0.426 189 0.238  0.427 ‐0.048 ‐0.002 1.009
Join credit association, ask partner   178 0.101 0.302 190 0.126  0.333 ‐0.76 ‐0.025 1.249
Partner encouraged to participate outside 
household  178 0.506 0.501 193 0.477  0.501 0.556 0.029 0.943
Partner asks for advice  178 0.416 0.494 193 0.451  0.499 ‐0.679 ‐0.035 1.084
Partner keeps from friends  178 0.888 0.317 193 0.876  0.331 0.357 0.012 0.986
Partner restricts contact w\family  178 0.927 0.261 193 0.922  0.268 0.17 0.005 0.995
Partner insists on knowing where she is  178 0.854 0.354 193 0.819  0.386 0.918 0.035 0.959
Partner controls access to health care  178 0.899 0.302 193 0.788  0.41 2.991 0.111 0.876
Partner boasts g‐friends  178 0.938 0.241 193 0.922  0.268 0.601 0.016 0.983
Partner threatened eviction  178 0.944 0.231 193 0.891  0.312 1.855 0.053 0.944
Spend own money ‐ Ask Partner  92 2.935 0.248 153 2.941  0.236 ‐0.199 ‐0.006 1.002
Panel C: Attitudes towards Women and Violence  Women should do all chores  419 1.752 0.432 424 1.663  0.473 2.852 0.089 0.949
If paid lobola, wife must obey  419 1.668 0.471 425 1.614  0.487 1.64 0.054 0.968
Wife asks condom, disrespectful  410 1.917 1.459 413 1.835  0.371 1.099 0.082 0.957
Wife asks condom, sleeps around  408 1.811 0.392 413 1.804  0.398 0.269 0.007 0.996
Man has g‐friends, must tolerate  420 1.812 0.391 423 1.823  0.382 ‐0.405 ‐0.011 1.006
Wife must not divorce  418 1.689 0.463 422 1.690  0.463 ‐0.018 ‐0.001 1.00
Ok to refuse sex if not want  416 1.538 0.499 423 1.522  0.5 0.464 0.016 0.99
Ok to refuse sex if no condom  413 1.528 0.5 418 1.5  0.501 0.802 0.028 0.982
Ok to refuse sex if angry for other g‐friends  419 1.477 0.5 424 1.434  0.496 1.264 0.043 0.971











  Non‐Participants  Participants  Comparison 
   N  Mean SD  N  Mean SD  t Diff %Chng
Age  420 42.519 12.594 426 42.077 10.904 0.545 0.442 0.99
Marital Status  420 2.15 1.09 426 2.277 1.049 ‐1.727 ‐0.127 1.059
Parity  420 4.417 2.885 425 5.009 2.955 ‐2.95 ‐0.593 1.134
Connectedness  426 2.178 1.263 428 2.874 1.383 ‐7.671 ‐0.695 1.319
Maximum Schooling  425 1.386 0.572 426 1.458 0.632 ‐1.739 ‐0.072 1.052
Total Asset Value  412 4,265.09  7,284.84  421 5,245.02     9,927.12 ‐ 1.627 ‐979.929 1.23
Non‐livestock Value  412 3,204.97    6,115.00  421      3,576.25     6,991.39 ‐ 0.816 ‐371.283 1.116
Livestock Value  413 1,057.56    3,139.42  422      1,664.92     5,978.12 ‐ 1.843 ‐607.358 1.574
Type of Toilet  421 2.268 0.485 425 2.191 0.405 2.533 0.078 0.966
Access to Electricity  422 1.218 0.413 425 1.195 0.397 0.816 0.023 0.981
Dwelling Walls Material  422 4.265 1.241 425 4.393 1.306 ‐1.457 ‐0.128 1.03









Does not ask husband’s permission for:  Non‐Participants  Participants  Non‐Participants  Participants 
Small purchases for herself   0.359***  ‐0.067  0.200*  0.174 
  (0.0626)  (0.0791)  (0.0856)  (0.103) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline    ‐19%  56%  48% 
         
Large purchases for own self, does not ask for  0.228***  ‐0.00302  0.143  0.0945 
husband's permission  (0.0503)  (0.09)  (0.0924)  (0.156) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline    ‐1%  63%  41% 
  
Small purchases for the hh, does not ask for husband's  0.672***  0.0495  0.123  0.00542 
Permission  (0.068)  (0.0459)  (0.0688)  (0.0807) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline    7.40%  18.30%  0.80% 
        
Medium purchases for the hh, does not ask for  0.351*** ‐ 0.0921  0.240**  0.233** 
husband's permission  (0.0522)  (0.0615)  (0.0774)  (0.0928) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline   ‐ 26.24%  68.38%**  66.38%** 
        
Large purchases for the hh  0.228*** ‐ 0.0518  0.0837  0.171 
   (0.0503)  (0.0781)  (0.0891)  (0.13) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline    ‐23%  37%  75% 
        
Taking children to hospital,  0.520*** ‐ 0.0785  0.0618  0.199 
   (0.118)  (0.113)  (0.171)  (0.195) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline    ‐15.10%  11.90%  38.30% 
        
Visit Family of Birth  0.352*** ‐ 0.0986 ‐ 0.0776  0.314 
   (0.097)  (0.108)  (0.136)  (0.177) % change relative to non‐participant baseline    ‐28% ‐ 22%  89% 
         
Visit Friends  0.491*** ‐ 0.0317  0.16  0.124 
   (0.0854)  (0.0869)  (0.118)  (0.143) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline    ‐6.46%  32.59%  25.25% 
         
Visits Family and Friends outside the  0.260*** ‐ 0.00703  0.0165  0.169 
 husband's permission  (0.0598)  (0.0814)  (0.0874)  (0.143) 











% who disagree that  non‐participant  participant  non‐participant  participant 
Woman should do most hh chores  1.747*** ‐ 0.0766* ‐ 0.133*  0.210*** 
   (0.0224)  (0.0363)  (0.0562)  (0.0598) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  ‐4.38%* ‐ 7.61%*  12.02%*** 
Wife must obey Husband who paid Lobola  1.615*** ‐ 0.0599 ‐ 0.0473  0.212* 
   (0.0250)  (0.0461)  (0.0969)  (0.0951) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  ‐3.7% ‐ 2.9%  13.1%* 
A wife is disrespectful if asks to use a condom  2.149*** ‐ 0.0386  1.427* ‐ 1.242 
   (0.201)  (0.265)  (0.710)  (0.660) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  ‐1.8%  66.4% ‐ 57.8% 
If wife asks for condom she is unfaithful  2.124***  0.0367  1.287** ‐ 1.093* 
(0.156)  (0.172)  (0.501)  (0.463) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  1.7%  60.6%** ‐ 51.5%* 
A man must have many girlfriends; wife tolerate  1.684***  ‐0.0153  0.0250  0.265 
(0.0994)  (0.110)  (0.0901)  (0.240) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline     ‐0.9%  1.5%  15.7% 
Women should never divorce their husband  1.711***  0.0120 ‐ 0.0465  0.150 
   (0.0421)  (0.0549)  (0.0854)  (0.0886) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  0.70% ‐ 2.72%  8.77% 
Married Woman can refuse sex if does not want it  1.494*** ‐ 0.0223 ‐ 0.0450 ‐ 0.141 
   (0.0611)  (0.0759)  (0.108)  (0.112) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  ‐0.01493 ‐ 0.03012 ‐ 0.09438 Married woman can refuse sex if husband will not wear a condom  1.596*** ‐ 0.0199  0.874* ‐ 1.003** 
(0.132)  (0.145)  (0.453)  (0.419) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline ‐ 1.2%  54.8%* ‐ 62.8%** 
If she is angry because he has other g‐friends,   1.395*** ‐ 0.0579  0.146 ‐ 0.311 
married woman can refuse sex   (0.106)  (0.0537)  (0.202)  (0.192) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline ‐ 4%  10% ‐ 22% 
She worries he might have AIDS, married woman can refuse sex  1.282*** ‐ 0.0491  1.017 ‐ 1.172 
(0.224)  (0.255)  (0.799)  (0.739) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline ‐ 4%  79% ‐ 91% 
Ok to beat wife if she refuses to have sex  1.830***  0.0368* ‐ 0.00277  0.000886 
(0.00972)  (0.0184)  (0.00192)  (0.00183) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  2.0%* ‐ 0.2%  0.0% 
Ok to beat wife if she asks to use a condom  2.634*** ‐ 0.477  0.00632 ‐ 0.00740 
(0.195)  (0.291)  (0.00654)  (0.00934) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline ‐ 18.1%  0.2% ‐ 0.3% 
Ok to beat wife if she is unfaithful  1.724***  0.0150 ‐ 0.00257  0.00120 
(0.0367)  (0.0284)  (0.00280)  (0.00282) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  0.87% ‐ 0.15%  0.07% 
Ok to beat wife if she disagrees in public  1.924*** ‐ 0.502  0.00536 ‐ 0.00184 
(0.181)  (0.354)  (0.00658)  (0.00434) 











non‐participant  participant  non‐participant  participant 
Insult  0.882*** ‐ 0.0176  0.0239  0.0309* 
(0.0237)  (0.0104)  (0.0140)  (0.0137) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline ‐ 2%  2.71%  3.50%* 
Push  0.0915***  0.0112  0.00612 ‐ 0.0466** 
(0.00684)  (0.00801)  (0.0117)  (0.0168) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  12.2%  6.7% ‐ 51%** 
Has been hit with a fist by partner  0.0782***  0.0129*  0.0157 ‐ 0.0371** 
(0.00532)  (0.00550)  (0.00950)  (0.0121) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  16.50%*  20% ‐ 47%** 
Has had Forced Sex w Partner  0.0720*** ‐ 0.00237  0.0195* ‐ 0.0223 
(0.00799)  (0.00435)  (0.00833)  (0.0164) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline ‐ 3%  27.08%* ‐ 31% 
Total Violence  0.231***  0.0204  0.0337* ‐ 0.0844*** 
(0.0189)  (0.0147)  (0.0161)  (0.0239) 
% change relative to non‐participant baseline  9%  14.59%* ‐ 37%*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.  Results that are significant at the 0.05 
(0.10, 0.01) level are marked with a ** (*, ***).  Each row presents the results from a separate regression with the dependent 
variables listed in each row.  Percent changes in panel B are based on comparison to females in the control group prior to 
treatment.  Outcome measures based on survey data collected by Intervention with Microfinance for Gender Equity (IMAGE) in 
South Africa, a cooperation between the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), Wits University in 
Johannesburg, and the microfinance NGO Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF). Results presented in Kim et al (2009).  Estimates 
based on author’s own calculations.  Participants refer to individuals randomly selected to attend 10‐series discussion group 
series.  Non‐Participants refer to individuals not selected to attend the program.   
  